Most foundational work in contest theory assumes complete information. Yet, in reality, information is the central challenge. This book argues that the allocation of what is known, unknown, and learnable is not a secondary detail; it is a first-order determinant of effort, participation, and optimal design.
This volume provides a comprehensive and fully up-to-date survey and synthesis of information in contest theory for scholars and graduate students in economics. Integrating foundational work with research as recent as 2025, it traces a logical progression from static contests to dynamic and complex ones, providing self-contained statements of the central mechanisms. Key questions addressed include:
- How do disclosure policies affect outcomes under asymmetric information?
- What drives the discouragement and coasting effects in dynamic contests?
- When can contestants strategically manipulate information channels or signal through actions?
The book’s main contribution is its concept-driven organization. This approach synthesizes the literature by its primary strategic levers and effects, providing a systematic entry point and charting the core Motivation–Selection Frontier to identify structural trade-offs and open research questions.
